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Cold comfort: § 1983 as the exclusive damages remedy
for violations of § 1981 by State Actors
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Introduction
Identifying a meaningful remedial mechanism to address deprivations of civil rights by States and
state actors acting in their official capacity has become an exercise in futility. There are millions of
African American men and women employed by State governments as doctors, teachers, professors,
2
These African American
janitors, engineers, police officers, court personnel, and administrators.
employees "constitute a disproportionately large share of the state and local public sector workforce." 3
Millions more African Americans interact on a daily basis with and are affected by decisions made by
States, state agencies and offices, and state actors acting in their official capacities. Although African
Americans are facially protected by Civil Rights legislation enacted by Congress to address racially
motivated deprivations of civil rights by States and state actors, the remedies afforded to them to address
deprivations of their rights are quite limited.
Federal jurisprudence does not recognize any meaningful damages remedy for deprivations by
States and state actors of the civil rights guaranteed by Congress. Additionally, the question of whether
the federal judiciary can imply a private right of action to enforce the rights guaranteed by Civil Rights
legislation against States and state actors remains unresolved.
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court in Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist.,4
acknowledged the existence of an implied private right of action for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
hereinafter referred to as § 1981, by private actors within the textual framework of the statute.
Unfortunately, neither the text of § 1981 or its legislative history offered guidance regarding the
appropriate remedial scheme for addressing violations of § 1981 by governmental actors. In Jett, the
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 hereinafter referred to as § 1983, provides the exclusive federal
remedy for civil rights violations against state actors originating from the language of § 1981 as it was

2 See generally Steven Pitts. Research Brief: Black Workers and the Public Sector. Work in the Black Community, UC Berkeley
Labor Center, (April 4, 2011) ("The public sector is the single most important source of employment for African Americans.").
David Cooper. Mary Gable & Algernon Austin, The Public-sectorJobs Crisis: Women and African Americans Hit Hardest by
Job Losses in State and Local Governments, ECON. POLICY INST. (May 2. 2012). http://www.epi.org/publication/bp339-publicsector-jobs-crisis/ ("Historically, the state and local public sectors have provided more equitable opportunities for women and
people of color. As a result, women and African Americans constitute a disproportionately large share of the state and local
public-sector workforce.").
4 Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
' Id. at 731.
6 Originally enacted as Section 1 of "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and For other Purposes." Act of April 20, 1871. ch. 22. 17 Stat. 13 (1871), and currently codified as 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2006).
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codified at the time of the decision.7 The Supreme Court concluded that
We have noted in the past that the addition of the phrase 'and laws' to the text of what is now §
1983 . .. was at least intended to make clear that the guarantees contained in § 1 of the 1866 Act
were to be enforced against state actors through the express remedy for damages contained in §
1983.'
One of the primary reasons underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Jett can be traced to its
determination that Congress established another remedial scheme to address § 1981 claims against state
actors. The Court looked to § 1983 as the exclusive source of "remedies available" for private actions
against state actors. To be held liable for a violation of § 1983, a "person" must act "under color of
[State] law." 9 The United States Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police'o held that

under § 1983, the term 'person' does not include "a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities."" Thus, § 1981 claimants pursuing private actions against state actors were left to face an
impenetrable hurdle that cannot be overcome in light of the holding in Jett.
This analysis became even more difficult in 1991 when Congress amended § 1981 to make it clear
that the rights created therein are "protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of state law." 12 Thus, as amended, § 1981 expressly provides for a private right
of action against state actors.13 The critical question left outstanding after Jett and the addition of § 1981
(c) is whether Courts have the authority to imply a private right of action for damages against a state actor
into the textual framework of § 1981. Federal circuits have taken divergent views on the continued
viability of Jett following the 1991 amendments to § 1981.14 Some federal judges have adopted the
position that a private right of action for damages against governmental actors can be implied from the
textual framework of § 1981. However, the majority of the circuits following the Supreme Court's
analysis in Jett hold § 1983 is the exclusive remedial statute for asserting § 1981 damages claims against
governmental actors.

7 Jett. 491 U.S. at 735 ("We hold that the express 'action at law' provided by § 1983 for the 'deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation
of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.").
8

Id. at 731.

9 The text of Section 1983 limits its coverage to "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia."
10 Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
11 Id. at 71.
12 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071-1109 (1991), codified in pertinent part in 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)
(2006).
13 Id.
14

See generally McCormick v. Miami Univ.. 693 F.3d 654, 658-63 (6th Cir. 2012).
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Notwithstanding the position adopted by the federal judiciary regarding the continued viability of
Jett, it is certain that Congress enacted § 1981 amendments to safeguard the rights of African Americans
to remain free from deprivations of their civil rights by States and state actors. It is also certain that,
contrary to the holding in Jett, § 1983 does not offer African Americans a meaningful damages remedy
against States and state actors for violations of § 1981 because these governmental parties enjoy Eleventh
Amendment15 immunity from liability under § 1983.
This Article will examine the scope of civil rights remedies afforded to African Americans in the
Civil Rights Act of 186616 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 and their present day codifications found in
Title 42 U.S.C. § 19811 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,19 respectively. The existence of a viable private damages
remedy against States and state actors depends on the resolution of two issues. First, this Article will
examine whether a right of action for damages against States and state actors may be implied from the
1991 amended text of § 1981 (c).
Second, if there is no implied right of action and the Jett decision controls this analysis, this
Article will then argue that § 1983 fails to afford a meaningful remedy to address civil rights deprivations
committed by States and state actors because these governmental actors are immunized from § 1983
liability. Finally, this Article will propose that Congress exercise its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and abrogate the sovereign immunity that these governmental actors enjoy under § 1983.
II. Civil Rights Jurisprudence - Civil Rights Act of 1866
Section 1981, which was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,20 provided that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.21
Section 1981 descended from the Section 1 of Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was passed one
15 U.S. CONST.

amend. XI.
"An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights. and furnish the Means of their Vindication." Act of
April 9, 1866. ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
17 Section 1 of "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and For
other Purposes." Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
16

19Id.
20
21

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Id.
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year after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. The language of the 1866 Act and § 1981 created a
number of rights, including the right to contract, the right to participate in the judicial process, and the
right to hold and protect real and personal property.23 The text of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 created essential civil rights protections for African Americans, but failed to provide an express
private enforcement scheme within the language of the statute.24 The failure to include a remedial scheme
in the 1866 Act did not go un-noticed. When introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 before the 3 9 h
Congress, Senator Lyman Trumball argued that the language of the 1866 Act would amount to "nothing
more that the declaration in the Constitution itself unless we have the machinery to carry it into effect." 25
Federal jurisprudence clearly requires that private rights of action to enforce federal laws must be
26
2
created by Congress2. In Calfornia v. Sierra Club,27 the United States Supreme Court, held that where,
as with § 1981, statutory language is silent, "[t]he federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute,
no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide."28 In the absence of an express
congressionally enacted remedial scheme, the judiciary has limited authority to imply statutory remedies
into its textual framework.29
There are, however, circumstances where courts imply a remedial scheme to address a violation of
rights granted within the terms of that statute. The common law has developed the Implied Remedy
Doctrine to address these situations. Dating back to the 1803 decision of Marbury v. Madison, and the
1916 decision in Texas & Pacific R. Company v. Rigsby,

31

the United States Supreme Court has long

recognized that the absence of an express statutory remedy was not fatal to the enforcement of the rights
granted within the four corners of that statute. Under the historical application of the Implied Remedy
Doctrine, courts were authorized to effectuate the underlying purpose of the statute by implying "the right
to recover the damages from the party in default...."3 2
As common law evolved, the United States Supreme Court adopted a four-part test in Cort v. Ash 33
to determine whether the Court should recognize a private right of action for statutory violations.
Although never overruled, the Cort test has been narrowed to focus the Court's inquiry primarily on
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
23

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).

24 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not "provide for an express damages remedy for violations of the provisions of § 1." Jett,

491 U.S. at 720.

Id. at 714 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.. 1st Session, 475 (1866)).
26 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
27 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287 (1981).
25

28 Id. at 297.

29 Jett. 491 U.S. at 732.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163-64 (1803).

31 Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
32 Id. at 39.

3 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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whether recognition of an implied remedy is within the scope of Congressional intent underlying the
statute.
III. Implied Private Right of Action against state actors

III.C Jett and the Supreme Court's rejection of an Implied Damages Remedy for § 1981 actions
In 1989, the Supreme Court was asked to apply the Implied Remedy Doctrine within the context of
a § 1981 violation. The Jett decision sets forth two holdings, only one of which is relevant herein.34
Justice O'Connor, writing the plurality opinion in Jett, held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not provide an
independent federal cause of action for damages against governmental entities. Instead, Jett held that
"Congress intended that the explicit remedial provisions of § 1983 be controlling in the context of
damages actions brought against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981."
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that § 1981 created a right against private actors for violating the
guarantee of equal rights to make and enforce contracts, and an implied damages remedy within § 1981 as
a mechanism for enforcement of that right. 36 However, with respect to state actors, Congress did not
intend for the implicit damages remedy to extend to state actors. The Plurality in Jett determined that
Congress intended that the remedial provisions of Section 1983 3 to be the exclusive remedy against state
actors for violations of § 1981. After examining the legislative history of both statutes, Justice O"Connor
argued that
there is very strong evidence that the 42nd Congress which enacted the precursor of section 1983
thought that it was enacting the first, and at that time the only, federal damages remedy for the
violation of federal constitutional and statutory rights by state governmental actors. The
historical evidence surrounding the revision of 1874 further indicates that Congress thought that
the declaration of rights in § 1981 would be enforced against state actors through the remedial
provisions of § 1983.

3 Jett, 491 U.S. at 740 (Scalia. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The Court appears to decide today
(though its precise holding is less than pellucid) that liability for violations by the government of § 1981 may not be predicated
on a theory of respondeat superior.").

3 Id. at 731.
36

3 Jett. 491 U.S. at 731 ("That we have read [Section 1981] to reach private action and have implied a damages remedy to
effectuate the declaration of rights contained in that provision does not authorize us to do so in the context of the 'state action'
portion of section 1981. where Congress has established its own remedial scheme.").
37 Civil Rights Act of 1871 (ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 241. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985(3). and
1988 (commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act).
38 Jett. 491 U.S. at 734.
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The plurality in Jett read an implied cause of action for damages into § 1981 against private actors
out of necessity. Citing Cannon v. University of Chicago,39 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that "there
existed no other remedy to address such violations of the statute." 40 That was not the case with actions
brought against state actors. Following the creation of a remedy for damages in § 1983, speculation as to
whether there should be an implied remedy was no longer necessary because § 1983 was an explicit
indicator that "Congress has established its own remedial scheme."41 It is this reasoning that supports
Jett's holding that an action brought under § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by
state actors. Notwithstanding Jett, and the trend within the Federal judiciary supporting its holding, many
42
litigants continue to pursue § 1981 claims against governmental entities.
These aggrieved litigants
argue that the remedial scheme relied upon by Justice O'Connor in Jett is inherently flawed. Contrary to
the position adopted by Justice O'Connor, the remedial scheme established by Congress to address §
1981 violations specifically immunizes some state actors from liability under § 1983.43
II.B Justice Brennan's dissent in Jett
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, authored a blistering opinion
dissenting to the plurality's decision in Jett. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that § 1981, originally
enacted as a part of Section 1 of the Civil Rights of 1866, "itself affords a cause of action in damages on
the basis of governmental conduct violating it terms.

...

This position certainly bolsters the minority

position taken by the Ninth Circuit that a cause of action for all violations of the rights guaranteed by §
1981 can be implied solely from the language of the statute itself.
The dissenters in Jett argued that the plurality needed to look no further than the Court's own
jurisprudence to find that a private cause of action against state actors can be implied under § 1981.
Justice Brennan noted that Congressional omission of an express cause of action in the language of
Section 1981 was of "little moment" 45 and "small consequence" 46 because the federal judiciary had
"routinely concluded that a statute setting forth substantive rights without specifying a remedy contained
an implied cause of action for damages incurred in violation of the statute's terms."47

3 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 728 (1979) (White. J.. dissenting).
40 491 U.S. at 732.
41 Id. at 731.

42 See Showell v. Bd. of Educ. of Wicomico Cnty.. 2011 WL 5877220; Victors v. Kronmiller, 553 F. Supp. 2d 533 (D. Md.
2008).
43 See discussion infra at Section VI.
44 Jett. 491 U.S. at 740.
45 Id. at 742.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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In the absence of any reference to an implied cause of action in the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which amended § 1981, modern jurists have used statutory methods of interpretation
to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy against state actors under § 1981
itself.48 Justice Brennan's discussion of the legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act in his
dissenting opinion foreshadowed this argument. Justice Brennan argued that it was better to interpret
Congressional intent by using the common law principles set forth in the 1916 decision from Texas v.
Rigsby,49 arguing that "[a]n inquiry into Congress' actual intent must take account of the interpretive
principles in place at the time."50 Justice Brennan afforded considerable weight to the Rigsby test which
stated that:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law.

1

The determination that a cause of action could be implied into the interpretation of § 1981, using
Rigsby, was clear to Justice Brennan. Over one hundred years before the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act guaranteed that African Americans would enjoy the same
contractual rights as enjoyed by white citizens.52 Failure to imply a cause of action for damages within
the textual language of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would have rendered the protections
afforded by Congress meaningless. A review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
supports Justice Brennan's approach to interpreting the 39th Congress's intent.
In introducing the bill that became the 1866 Act, Senator Trumbull explained that the statute was
necessary because "[t]here is very little importance in the general declaration of abstract truths and
principles [contained in the Thirteenth Amendment] unless they can be carried into effect, unless the
persons who are to be affected by them have some means of availing themselves of their benefits." Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1866) (emphasis added). Representative Thayer of Pennsylvania
echoed this theme: "When I voted for the amendment to abolish slavery ... I did not suppose that I was
offering ... a mere paper guarantee." "The bill which now engages the attention of the House has for its
object to carry out and guaranty the reality of that great measure. It is to give to it practical effect and
force. It is to prevent that great measure from remaining a dead letter upon the constitutional page of this
48 See generally Pittman v. Oregon, 509 F.3d 1065, 1069 (6th Cir. 2007) (summarizing recent cases examining the legislative
history of § 1981 (c)).
49 Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
50 Jett. 491 U.S. at 742 n.2.
51 Id. at 742 (citing 247 U.S. at 39-40).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Five years passed before Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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country."54
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected the use of the four-part test articulated by the Court in its 1975
decision in Cort v. Ash 55 to determine whether § 1981 contained an implied cause of action. Although
Justice Brennan determined that using the Cort test would lead to the same outcome, he concluded that
"[i]t would make no sense, however, to apply a test first enunciated in 1975 to a statute enacted in 1866. .
. . Thus I would interpret § 1981 in light of the principle described in Rigsby rather than the one described
in Cort."5
IV. Congressional Response following Jett - Civil Rights Act of 1991
Congressional response following Jett was swift. In 1990, Congress took up the task of amending
the existing civil rights legislation. 8 Congress amended § 1981 by adding a specific subsection that
addresses deprivations of rights committed by governmental actors. 59 The stated purposes of these
amendments were "to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws" 60 and "to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination."6 1 The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
reveals that Congress made specific references to the Supreme Court's decisions Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,62 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, and Runyon v. McCrary64 when debating the merits

54 Jett. 491 U.S. at 743.

SCort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

56 491 U.S. at 742 n.2, (Brennan, J.. dissenting) ("Application even of the test fashioned in Cort. however, would lead to the

conclusion that Jett may bring a cause of action in damages against respondent under § 1981.").
57 Id.
58"By restoring the broad scope of Section 1981, Congress will ensure that all Americans may not be harassed, fired or otherwise
discriminated against in contracts because of their race." 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 695. House Report No. 102-40(11). May 17,
1991, P.L. 102-166, 1991 WL 87020.
59 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, as enacted November 21, 1991. Section 3 [42 U.S.C. 1981 note]. the Purposes of
which were "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination."
60 Id; see generally Roger Clegg, Introduction:A BriefLegislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 54 LA. L. REv. 1459
(1994); Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of]991 and EEOC Enforcement, 23 STETSON L. REv. 53 (1993).
61 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66. § 3(4) 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
62 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See generally, H.R. Rep. 102-40. 6,
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 698
For eighteen years following the Griggs decision, the employer in a disparate impact case indisputably bore the burden
of demonstrating that a practice shown by the complaining party to have a disparate impact was required by business
necessity. In Wards Cove. the Supreme Court overruled this aspect of Griggs, holding that while the employer has the
burden of producing evidence justifying an employment practice shown to have a disparate impact, the 'burden of
persuasion ... remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff.' Wards Cove Packing. 490 U.S. at 659. Subsection 703(k)(1)
is intended to overrule this part of the Wards Cove decision and would restore to the employer the burden of justifying
practices shown to have a disparate impact. Id. at 699.
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of this legislation. Curiously, in the hearings, no references were made to the Jett decision, position
statements, or other supporting materials considered by the U.S. House of Representatives or the Senate.
During this time period, the United States Supreme Court addressed a number of cases relevant to
the interpretation and application of § 1981. The first case was Runyon v. McCrary,6 in which the Court
considered whether § 1981 prohibits private schools from using race as the sole basis for excluding
66
qualified African American children. As to this issue, the Court held that § 1981 "prohibits racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts." The Runyon majority held that:
The petitioning schools and school association argue principally the Section 1981 does not reach
private acts of racial discrimination. The view is wholly inconsistent with [Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. 's] interpretation of the legislative history of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and this consistent interpretation of the law necessarily requires the conclusion that section 1981,
like section 1982, reaches private conduct.68
The Supreme Court re-visited its decision in Runyon in 1989 in Patterson v. McLean Credit

Union.69 Relying upon the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court in Patterson decided against overturning the
Runyon decision, 70 but the Court recognized that "[s]ome Members of th[e] Court believe[d] that Runyon
was decided incorrectly. . 71 To civil rights advocates, the continued validity of Runyon was tenuous
victory. In Patterson, the Supreme Court's textual interpretation of § 1981 rendered the statute
functionally useless. As to the statutory guarantee that the right to make contracts is free of racial bias,
the Court held that § 1981's language was limited "only to the formation of a contract, but not to
problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment."72 The Court went on to
note that the right to make contracts free from racial discrimination does not extend "to conduct by the
employer after the contract relation has been established."7 3 Such matters were viewed as more
appropriately within the purview of "state contract law and Title VII." 74
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
64 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 164-65.

67 Id. at 168.
68 Id. at 173.

69 Patterson, 491 U.S. 164 (superceded by 42 U.S.C. § 1981). After hearing oral arguments in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, the Court requested the parties briefs and requested that the parties argue the additional question of whether the Court's
interpretation of Section 1981 as adopted in Runyon should be reconsidered.
70 Id. at 170-72.
71 Id.

72 Id. at 176.

73 Id. at 177.
74 Id.
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As to the rights guaranteed in § 1981 pertaining to the enforcement of contracts, the Court in
Patterson held that "the right to enforce contracts does not . . . extend beyond conduct by an employer

which impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal process his or her established contract
rights."7 5 Section 1981, properly interpreted, applied to "wholly private efforts to impede access to the
courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of binding obligations, as
,76

well as discrimination by private entities. . . ."

As a result, the Court refused to recognize that the

plaintiff had a cognizable claim for racial harassment arising from the "postformation conduct by the
employer relating to the terms and conditions of continuing employment."77
In 1991, Congress added two new subsections to the Civil Rights Act.78 Subsection (b) was added
to § 1981 in direct response to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Section 1981 in Patterson.79
Subsection 1981 (b) provides that
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined
For purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.8 0
The Legislative History of subsection (b) clearly indicates that Congress intended to overrule
Patterson by defining the scope of § 1981 to "bar all racial discrimination in contracts"81 including
conduct occurring prior to, during and subsequent to the formation of the contract. Congress was also
concerned that the Patterson decision "had profoundly negative consequences both in the employment
context and elsewhere,"82 noting that hundreds of racial discrimination claims were dismissed by federal
courts after the ruling.83

75 491 U.S. at 177-78.
76 Id. at 177.

77 Id. at 179.
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (b).
(c).
79 "This section amends 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (commonly referred to as 'Section 1981') to overturn Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union and to codify Runyon v. McCrary. 427 U.S. 160 (1976)." 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 728. H.R. No. 102-40(11), May 17,
1991. P.L. 102-66. 1991 WL 87020.
80 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b).
8 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694. 731. H. Rep. No. 102-40(11), May 17. 1991, P.L. 102-66, 1991 WL 87020.
82 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 629. H. Rep. No. 102-40(). Apr. 24, 1991, P.L.
102-66. 1991 WL 70454.
83 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630. H. Rep. No. 102-40(1), Apr. 24, 1991. P.L. 102-166, 1991 WL
70454 ("The Committee finds
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Patterson conflicts with a substantial body of federal appellate case law defining the scope of
section 1981. The Committee also finds no basis in the Civil Rights Act of 1966 or its legislative history for distinguishing
between race discrimination which occurs at the formation of the employment contract and that which occurs later in the
performance of the contract. The Committee furthers finds that the Court's interpretation of one of our most important federal
civil rights laws crippled the statute's deterrent value and left millions of workers without federal protection against employment
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The language of § 1981 (c) broadened the scope of the Civil Rights Act to include protection
"against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law." 84 The
Congressional intent underlying this subsection was to codify Runyon by prohibiting racial discrimination
in public and private contracting.85 Although the additional language in section (c) created a private cause
of action, the amended Act did not expressly create a private cause of action against state actors for
violations of its provisions. The legislative history of § 1981 (c) does not help to clarify this question in
that it does not reveal any explicit Congressional intent to overrule the plurality's decision in Jett.8 A
report to the House of Representatives, which discusses the Supreme Court, noted that amendments to
1981 were necessary because:
[The Supreme Court]. . . cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights
protections, and that as a result, existing protections and remedies are not adequate to deter
unlawful discrimination or to compensate victims of intentional discrimination.87

Although the language of § 1981 was amended, Congress offered no guidance regarding the
appropriate means or remedy for enforcing the amended statute against States or state actors.88 Current
Supreme Court jurisprudence does not offer any definitive analysis regarding whether a private right of
action for damages against state actors may be implied into the textual framework of the amended § 1981.
The federal judiciary has, therefore, been left to decide whether Jett requires § 1981 claimants to enforce
civil rights violations guaranteed in section (c) by asserting their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.89 This is

discrimination. As a consequence, the Committee concludes that there is a compelling need for legislation to overrule the
Patterson decision and ensure that federal law prohibits all race discrimination in all phases of the contractual relationship.").
84 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(c).
85 "This subsection is intended to codify Runyon v. McCrary. In Runyon, the Court held that Section
1981 prohibited intentional
racial discrimination in private, as well as public, contracting. The Committee intends to prohibit racial discrimination in all
contracts, both public and private.") 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 731. H. Rep. No. 102-40(11), May 17, 1991. P.L. 102-66. 1991 WL
87020.
8 "H.R. 1. the Civil Rights Act of 1991, has two primary purposes. The first is to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions. The second is to strengthen existing
protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate
compensation for victims of discrimination." 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694. H. Rep. No. 102-40(11), May 17. 1991. P.L. 102-66, 1991
WL 87020.
87 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, at 18 (1991). reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 556.
88 The Supreme Court has criticized legislative actions such as these that fail to provide a comprehensive remedial scheme for
the rights created therein. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court implied a private remedy into the provisions of Title IX.
but noted that "[w]hen Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better
course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights." 441 U.S. 677. 728 (1979).
89 See Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Courts have divided, however, over whether Jett is still
good law. Some contend that Jett was overruled by an amendment to § 1981 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991."). See also
Federationof African American Contractorsv. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204. 1209 (9th Cir. 1996) (Whether this amendment
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an especially difficult task when federal jurisprudence clearly requires that private rights of action to
enforce federal laws must be created by Congress. 90 As the United States Supreme Court held in
Californiav. Sierra Club,91 "[t]he federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how
salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide." 92 The absence of a Congressional directive is painfully
illustrated in the body of jurisprudence complied in the years following Jett.

V. Split in Circuits
VA Majority Views on Viability of Jett
The split between the circuit courts regarding whether an implied right of action exists under §
1981 against state actors has reached an apparent stalemate. The First, 93 Second, 94 Seventh, 95 and D.C.
Circuits have not yet issued a controlling opinion on this issue. The Third,96 Fourth,97 Fifth,98 Sixth, 99

overturns either or both of Jett's holdings is an unsettled question of law. The validity of Jett's two holdings following the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 has been challenged by courts and commentators alike.).
90 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
91 California. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
92 Id. at 297.

93 The First Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on this issue, but the District Court in Powell v. City ofPittsfield,followed the
Ninth Circuit's analysis in Cort and held that "[t]he court, therefore, recommends the adoption of the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the amended section 1981 overturns Jett's holding that section 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy against state
actors for violations of section 1981 rights." 143 F. Supp. 2d 94, 112 (D. Mass. 2001).
94 See Webster v. Fischer, 694 F. Supp. 2d 163, 195 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) ("While the Second Circuit has yet to rule on the continued
vitality of Jett following the amendments of section 1981 included within the Civil Rights Act of 1991, without clear guidance
from that court, other district courts have declined to deviate from Jett. Consistent with the decisions of these courts. I too opt
not to deviate from the Supreme Court's analysis of section 1981 in Jett."); Lawson v. New York City Bd. of Edu.. 2011 WL
5346091 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue...."); Ortiz v. City ofNew York. 755 F. Supp.
2d 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
95 McQueen v. City of Chicago, 803 F. Supp. 2d 892. 900 (N.D. 111.2011) ("Whether this holding [Jett] survived the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 is an open question, one not yet addressed by the Seventh Circuit."). But see Harrison v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 2011
WL 2470626, n.2 (N.D. 111.2011) ("Thus, a violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by a state actor is properly brought as a
so-called 'and laws' § 1983 claim.... That is how we construe the complaint, and that is how Plaintiff should plead any amended
complaint he files in the wake of this opinion.").
96 McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2009) ("In sum, because Congress neither explicitly created a
remedy against state actors under § 1981(c). nor expressed its intent to overrule Jett, we hold that 'the express cause of action for
damages created by § 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state
government units.' ... Accordingly, McGovern's § 1981 claim must fail": see also "A"a minor, et al. v. Gloucester Twp.. 2011
WL 297 3644 (D.N.J. 2011)) ("The Gloucester School District defendants are state actors. Indeed, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim
implicitly concedes this point. Accordingly. the Amended complaint fails to state a claim under § 1981.").
97 Dennis v. County of Fairfax. 55 F.3d 151. 156 (4th Cir. 1995) ("To the extent that these claims were pleaded under § 1981.
they run afoul of Jett.... Jett held that when suit is brought against a state actor, § 1983 is the 'exclusive federal' remedy for
violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981").
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Eighth,100 Tenth,101 and Eleventh 0 2 Circuits clearly follow Jett's holding, and do not recognize private
actions against state actors under § 1981. Only the Ninth Circuit in Federation has reached a contrary
conclusion.
V.B Minority View - Ninth Circuit - Federation
The most significant body of jurisprudence supporting Justice Brennan's dissent in Jett arises from
the Ninth Circuit. Following its 1996 decision in Federation,103 the Ninth Circuit has been routinely cited
as the only federal circuit to recognize that "the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 contains an implied cause of
action against state actors," 104 thereby overruling Jett's holding that § 1983 provides that exclusive federal
remedy against state actors for violations of rights under § 1981.105 Although the Ninth Circuit's
decisions are consistent with Justice Brennan's dissent, the analytical framework in Federation relies
heavily on Cort to evaluate the § 1981 amended text of the Civil Rights Act. o0 Justice Brennan used
Rigsby instead of Cort to determine whether a cause of action could be implied from the Civil Rights Act,
as originally enacted in 1866. He noted, however, that even using Cort, his finding of an implied cause of
action would have remained the same. 107

98 Oden v. Oktibbenha County, 246 F.3d 458. 463 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Subsection (c) does not expressly create a remedial cause of
action against local governmental entities, and we are not persuaded that such a remedy should be implied. In Jett the Court held
that Congress intended § 1983 to be the sole remedy for discrimination by persons acting under color of state law.").
99 Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587. 598-99 (6th Circuit 2008) ("Having rejected Plaintiffs argument that § 198 1(c)
overrules Jett. this Court has no choice but to follow Jett as binding authority. Accordingly. we hold that 'the express cause of
action for damages created by § 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by
state governmental units,' ... no independent cause of action against municipalities is created by § 1981(c).").
100Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Assn.. 161 F.3d 1178, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998) ("A federal action to enforce rights
under § 1981 against a state actor may only be brought pursuant to § 1983.").
101Bolden. 441 F.3d at 1137 ("We also agree with Butts, Congress does not overrule recent Supreme Court precedent so subtly.
The amendments to § 1981 do not expressly provide a private cause of action, as one would expect if Congress intended to set
aside Jett. The language of subsection (c) reaffirms the Supreme Court's holding in Runyon: it hardly confronts the holding in
Jett. And only one who never relies of committee reports would fail to be impressed by the total absence in the committee
reports of any mention of Jett and the language in both that the subsection was intended to codify Runyon. We, therefore,
conclude
that
even
after
the
1991
amendments
to
§ 1981. damages claims against state actors for § 1981 violations must be brought under § 1983.").
102 Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891. 894 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Instead, the Federation court and others have noted
Congress added subsection (c) to codify the Supreme Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary [citation omitted] which established
that § 1981 protects against private discrimination as well as discrimination by state actors. ... Congress provided no indication
that it contemplated creating a cause of action against state actors outside of § 1983, nor did it even mention the Supreme Court's
opinion in Jett.").
103 Fed'n. of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996).
104 See Sledge v. District of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 2d 140. 143-44
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
105 96 F.3d at 1214.
106

Id. at 1210-14.

107 See

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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The first Cort factor considered by the Ninth Circuit was whether the plaintiff was within the class
of persons for "whose 'especial benefit"' Congress enacted section (c) to § 1981.108 With respect to this
factor, the Ninth Circuit in Federation held that the plain language of section (c) "confers a right in favor
of the plaintiff." 109 The amendment created a "broad anti-discrimination principle," as evidenced by the
language in (c), prohibiting both governmental and non-governmental discrimination. 10 This statutory
language was interpreted by the Court to not only prohibit discrimination, but to further vest its intended
beneficiaries with federal rights to pursue a cause of action for such a violation.
The second Cort factor required the Ninth Circuit to examine the legislative history of § 1981 (c)
to determine whether Congress intended to create a cause of action against state actors. It is this factor
that the United States Supreme Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. RedingtonII viewed as the principle
component of the Cort analysis. 112 Although acknowledging that the legislative history of § 1981 (c)
"does not explicitly announce an intent to create (or deny) a private rights of action against a state
actor"' or "express an intent to overrule Jett," 114 the Ninth Circuit in Federation adopted an expansive
reading of the legislative history of§ 1981 (c).
The doctrine of mutuality of remedies serves as the foundation for the Ninth Circuit's lone stance
on this issue. First, the Court identified language from two Committee Reports' 15 that bolster the
argument that the Supreme Court's recognition of a cause of action against private entities requires a
similar determination for actions against state actors. The Ninth Circuit repeatedly uses the terms
"similarly,"' 16 "parallel protections,"1 17 "consistent,"' and "comparable" 119 to reach the conclusion that
Congress intended that the remedy implied in Jett for private violations of § 1981 (c) applies with equal
force to remedy conduct committed by state actors.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted that the legislative history of § 1981(c) clearly indicates that
1os Fed'n. ofAfrican American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1210. The Ninth Circuit analogized § 1981(c) to Title XI. noting that
both statutes "articulate broad anti-discrimination principles."
109 Id. at 1212.
110 Id. at 1211.

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
112 Id. at 575-76 ("The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private
cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort - the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and
its purpose ... are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.").
1 Fed'n. ofAfrican American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1212.
114 Id. at 1213.
115 Id. at 1212-13. See reports from the House Education and Labor Committee, H. Rep. No. 102-40(1), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.

92, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630: and the House Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rep. No. 102-40(11).
1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694. 731.
11' 96 F.3d at 1212.

117 Id. at 1213.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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Congress enacted this section to codify Runyon. 120 Since Runyon recognized that an implied cause of
action exists for violations of § 1981 by private defendants, the Ninth Circuit, relying on the mutuality
doctrine, concluded that Congress also intended that the same remedy should be available to address
discriminatory conduct committed by state actors. 12 1 Federation noted:
Because § 1981(c) affords identical protection against 'impairment by nongovernmental
discrimination' and 'impairment under color of State law,' and because § 1981(c) implicitly
codifies an implied cause of action against private defendants, we infer that § 1981(c) also
contains an implied cause of action against state actors who 'impair' a claimant's § 1981 rights. 122
The third and fourth factors of the Cort analysis were easily addressed by the Ninth Circuit in
Federation. The third factor required the Court to consider whether "it is consistent with the underlying
purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy"[.] 123 Evaluating the Congressional purpose
and enactment of the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act,
[s]ubsections 1981(b) and (c) were both added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub.L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. at 1071-72. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted for the express purpose of
"respond[ing] to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil
rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." 105 Stat. at
1071. Congress believed that recent decisions by the Supreme Court had "cut back dramatically
on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protections," leaving what remained of historic civil
rights legislation "[in]adequate to deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate victims of
intentional discrimination." H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 18 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N
549, 556. Much of the Act is intended to "restor[e] the civil rights protections that were so
dramatically limited" by these Supreme Court decisions. Id.124 CITATION W/IN QUOTE
Federation adopted an expansive reading of § 1981(c) to "ensur[e] that the well-established rights
contained in the statute are guaranteed against both private parties and state actors."125 The Ninth Circuit
argued that this implied cause of action was not precluded by any other statutory scheme, 126 that there is
120

Id.
Id. ("In our view. Congress. in adding § 1981 (c) to codify Runyon, necessarily codified the implied cause of action on which
Runyon was based. We infer from § 1981(c)'s identical treatment of private entities that § 1981 (c) permits both an implied
cause of action against private defendants and an implied cause of action against governmental defendants.").
122 96 F.3d at
1213.
123 Id. at 1210.
124 For an excellent discussion of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see generallyArendale v. City of Memphis. 519 F.3d 587, 597 (6th
Cir. 2008).
125Fed'n. ofAfrican American Contractors,96 F.3d at 1214.
126 Id.
121
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no alternative enforcement mechanism in § 1981,
it would not disrupt existing federal civil rights
128
litigation, and would impose no greater burden on governmental parties than they already face under
the paradigm established by Jett.129 As a result, the Ninth Circuit adopted the position that there was no
need to go outside of the language of the section (c) when a cause of action could be crafted within the
framework of the statutory language of § 1981(c).
The fourth factor of the Cort analysis considered whether "the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?" 130 The answer to that question was a resounding 'no'. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[p]rivate
causes of action against state actors who impair federal civil rights have not been traditionally relegated to
state law." 131 Upon concluding that § 1981(c) overruled Jett's holding, the Ninth Circuit in Federation
found an implied cause of action against state actors for violating the provisions of § 1981.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Federation does not reveal any clues as to why the Ninth circuit
continued to rely on Cort in light of its growing judicial condemnation. Almost seven years before
Federationwas decided, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Thompson v. Thompson, 132 explicitly
criticized continued use of Cort's four factor test. Justice Scalia argued that "[i]t could not be plainer that
we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross. . . " Although the Supreme Court
never overruled Cort, beginning with its decision in Touche Ross v. Redington, the Court limited its focus
to the second Cort factor, "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a
private cause of action." 134
Justice Scalia revisited the continued survival of Cort when writing the majority opinion in
Alexander v. Sandoval,13 where he reiterated that the Court "abandoned" the statutory method of
interpretation from Cort, "and ha[s] not returned to it since." 3 The United States Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Sandovall37 sets forth the Court's most recent analysis of the Implied Remedy
127

Id.
Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1210.
131 Fed'n. ofAfrican American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1214.
132Thompson v. Thompson. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
128

133 Id. at 189.

134 In Touche Ross. the Supreme Court noted that (It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered
"relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not
decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort - the language and
focus of the statute. its legislative history, and its purpose. see 422 U.S. at 78 - -are ones traditionally relied upon in determining
legislative intent.") Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560. 575 (1979).
135See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
136 Id. at 287.

137See generally 532 U.S. 275.
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Doctrine. In Alexander, the Court utilized a two-step inquiry to determine whether a private right of
action exists under a federal statute. First, the inquiry will focus on "whether Congress intended to create
a personal right in the plaintiff."13 8 The Supreme Court has defined a 'right' as "a well-founded or
acknowledged claim." 139 The second part of the inquiry focuses on "whether Congress intended to create
a personal remedy for the plaintiff," 140 which requires the court to determine the "means employed to
enforce a right or redress an injury."14 1 Instead, Justice Scalia argued that
[t]he judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays
an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. [citation omitted]. Statutory
intent on this latter point is determinative. . . . Without it, a cause of action does not exist and

courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how
compatible with the statute.142
Following Justice Scalia's directive in Alexander, judicial determinations of whether a private
cause of action may be implied into the statutory framework of §1981 focus on whether congressional
intent can be determined from the text and structure of the statute.143 Beyond a reference to "text and
structure," unfortunately, Supreme Court jurisprudence has not developed clear parameters for this test. 144
In order to ascertain Congressional intent from statutory text, Justice Scalia, citing California v.
Sierra Club, 145 noted that statutes must contain "'rights-creating' language" 146 that focuses on "the person
regulated rather than the individuals protected [and] create[s] 'no implication of an intent to confer rights
on a particular class of persons."' 147 In Federation, the Ninth Circuit found that the rights creating
language of § 1981 was broad enough to sustain an interpretation that it prohibits discrimination
committed by both private and state actors. The addition of § 1981 (c) included "language that explicitly
protects § 1981 rights from 'impairment' by both private and governmental entities" and makes it clear

138Id.

Chelentis v. Luckenbach. 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918).
140 McGovern v. City of Philadelphia. 554 F.3d 114. 116 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Three Rights Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Housing
Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh. 382 F.3d 412, 412 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Put succinctly, for an implied right of action to exist, a statute
must manifest Congress's intent to create (1) a personal right, and (2) a private remedy.").
139

141247 U.S. at 384.
142532 U.S. at 286-87.

143Id. at 288 (stating that "we have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of text. In determining whether statutes
create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally. ... legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text.").
144See generally Wisniewski v. Rodule, Inc.. 510 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) (In the generation since the Supreme Court
declared that legislative intent to create an implied private right of action is the sole touchstone of our inquiry, the Court has not
provided a test for discerning this intent.").
145 532 U.S. at 289 (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287. 294 (1981)).
146Id. at 288.
147Id. at 289.
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"that Congress intended a comparable scope of protection against each type of defendant." 148
Additionally, courts must be able to ascertain the enforcement method from the statute in order to
determine a congressional intent to create a private remedy. 149 This is especially true when Congress
provides an enforcement method, in this case, § 1983, that "suggests that Congress intended to preclude
others." 5 o Justice Scalia argued:
when a statute has provided a general authorization for private enforcement of regulations, it may
perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each regulation can determine whether or not it is
privately enforceable. But it is most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can
conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies may
play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.151
In a minor rebuke to Congress, Justice Scalia went on to suggest that incomplete draftsmanship is
the primary reason why litigants attempt to imply a private cause of action into statute when "no such
right of action exists."

152

The Alexander decision notes that "when . . . Congress has not comprehensively

revised a statutory scheme but has made only isolated amendments, we have spoken more bluntly: 'It is
'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative
congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." 153
The one statutory method of interpretation that the Alexander court did not place great faith in
requires an examination of the "expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the
contemporary legal context" of the statute.154 The contemporary legal context of a statute encourages an
examination of the legislative history and circumstances existing when the statute was passed.155 This
examination oftentimes gives the court clear evidence of Congressional intent. The Supreme Court
cautioned that engaging in statutory interpretation to imply a private right of action contemporary legal
context is only relevant "to the extent it clarifies text,"156 and will never be afforded dispositive weight
"shorn of text."157
148Fed'n. ofAfrican American Contractors,96 F.3d at 1213.
149Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289.
150 Id. at 290.
151 Id. at 291.
152 Id. at 293.
153 Id. at 292.

154Id. at 287.
155See Arendale v. Memphis. 519 F.3d 587, 597-98 (6th Cir. 2008); see also McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654 (6th

Cir. 2011).

151 Id. at 288.

157Id. at 288. Although the Alexander decision suggests only limited circumstances where a review of the legislative history
would be appropriate, the Sixth Circuit in Arendale v. Memphis. did explore the legislative history of § 1981 before concluding
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However, with respect to the 1991 amendments to § 1981, the legislative history is not helpful in
ascertaining whether Congress intended that a private cause of action could be implied from the language
of § 1981. As the Supreme Court noted in Cannon, "[t]he legislative history of a statute that does not
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the
question."158
V. C Ninth Circuit's Clarification of Federation
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit muddied the waters of this analysis even more. In Pittman v. State of
Oregon,159 the Court questioned the applicability of Federation'sholding to actions brought against state
actors. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the holding in Federation that "the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981
contains a cause of action against state actors." 60 But, in Pittman, the Ninth Circuit, although not
overruling Federation, concluded that Federationwas inconsistent with the guiding principle underlying
the recognition of implied causes of action that courts cannot expand the scope of Congressionally
enacted statutory remedies.
As Justice O'Connor noted in Jett, "whatever the limits of the judicial
power to imply or create remedies, it has long been the law that such power should not be exercised in the
face of an express decision by Congress concerning the scope of remedies available under a particular
statute." 162
In Pittman, the Ninth Circuit argued that Federation's interpretation of § 1981(c) wrongfully
"expand[ed] the remedies available under that statute beyond those available under § 1983."
Federation's holding would permit private causes of action against state actors under § 1981, thus,
abrogating the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 164 Similarly, Federation's recognition of implied
liability against state actors under § 1981 ignored the Supreme Court's long-standing conclusion that
States are immunized from § 1981 liability by the Eleventh Amendment.165 The Ninth Circuit clearly

that the statute does not provide parallel remedies against private and state actors for § 1981 violations. Arendale v. Memphis,
519 F.3d at 597-98.
158Cannon. 441 U.S. at 694.
159Pittman v. State of Oregon. 509 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2007).
160Id. at 1069. ("We. however, in [Federation),. concluded that the addition of subsection (c) overruled Jett to create a cause of
action against municipalities. In reaching this holding, we acknowledge that 'the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not expressly
authorize private claimants to sue state actors directly.' . . . But we held that 'the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 contains a cause of
action against state actors.") Id.
16 Id. at 1070 ("We nonetheless reject the extension of Federationto suits against arms of the state . .
162Jett, 491 U.S. at 732.
163 509 F.3d at 1071.
164 Id. at 1071-73.

165See generally Binum v. Warnes, 2007 WL 54778 (D. Or. 2007) ("Generally actions for damages brought against the State or
its instrumentalities are banned by the Eleventh Amendment.): see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159. 169 n.17 (1985)
("sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amendment protects state officials from suit in official capacity); see also Pennhurst State
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noted that in the absence of a waiver or Congressional abrogation, the principle of sovereign immunity
166
prevents any private actions for damages under § 1981 and § 1983 against state actors.

VI. Limits of § 1983 Remedial Scheme
Section 1983 was originally enacted in 1871 when the 42nd Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, which was also referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act.167 By exercising the grant of authority
found in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed the 1871 Act to create a remedy that was
"designed to expose state and local officials to a new form of liability."168 This legislation was intended
to broaden the scope of Federal remedies available to African Americans who could not rely upon State
and local governments for protection and redress from violence, especially widespread acts and terror
perpetrated by members of the KKK and white supremacists.169 The 1871 Act was intended to create a
new federal private action for damages against every person, who, acting under the color of state law,
caused the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States."170
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). In fact numerous courts have held that actions against the State pursuant
to § 1981 are banned by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Freeman v. Michigan Dept. of State, 808 F.2d
1174. 1179 ("Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars a § 1981 action against a State.") Demuren v. Old Dominion Univ.. 33
F.Supp.2d 469. 474-75, n.5 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("With respect to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. this Court concurs with the view
held by a number of other federal courts that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not abrogated.").
16

509 F.3d at 1072.

167 See Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167. 171 (1961) for a discussion of the legislative history of§ 1983.
Section 1983] came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871. 17 Stat. 13. It was one of the means
whereby Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of
that Amendment. Senator Edmunds. Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, said concerning this section:
'The First section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States when they are assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the
principle of the civil rights bill. [Act of 1866] which has since become a part of the Constitution.' viz., the Fourteenth
Amendment."
See also McGovern, 554 F.3d at 117 ("In other words, Congress believed the 1871 bill was necessary because no
federal cause of action yet existed to enforce civil rights violations by state actors.").
161 Jett, 491 U.S. at 723 ("Second, the 1871 Act explicitly provided original federal jurisdiction for prosecution of these civil
actions against state actors."): see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police. 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) ("[A] principle purpose
behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims.").
169 The legislative history reveals that the swift passage of 1871 Act was due in large measure to President Ulysses S. Grant's
concern that the Post-Civil War terror inflicted upon African Americans "render[ed] life and property insecure, and that 'the
power to correct these evils [was] beyond the control of state authorities." Cong. Globe. 42 nd Cong., 1st Session, 244 (1871).

App. 68. 80. 83-85.
170 Section 1 of "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and for
other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13. Act of April 20. 1871, ch. 22.
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Subsection § 1981(c) of the Civil Rights Act creates a statutory framework that protects against
impairment of civil rights "under color of State law." The United States Supreme Court, under Jett,
requires litigants to assert § 1983 claims for damages against state actors for violations of rights
guaranteed by § 1981. One of the primary reasons underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Jett that
there is no § 1981 implied private action against states can be traced to its determination that Congress
established another remedial scheme to address these types of violations.
The Court looked to § 1983 as the exclusive source of "remedies available" for private actions
against state actors.171 The text of § 1983 limits its coverage to "[e]very person who [is] under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia." 172 The United States Supreme Court, in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,173 determined
that under § 1983, the term 'person' does not include "a State nor its officials acting in their official
,,174
capacities.
Unfortunately, the Eleventh Amendment175 immunizes a significant percentage of state actors from
the damages remedy provided by § 1983. 176 The Eleventh Amendment protects States and state actors
acting in their official capacity from suit in federal court.177 The immunity is not, however, absolute.
States can waive Eleventh Amendment immunity,178 consent to suit, 179 or Congress can abrogate the
immunity.180 Additionally, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar litigants from seeking injunctive
relief from States.181
The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that the legislative history of § 1983 does not
171Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 728 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
172

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

173 Will, 491 U.S. 58.

174Id. at 66. Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a
federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment
bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity or Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. Id.
175The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State. or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State U.S. CONST. amend
XI.
176Will. 491 U.S. at 71 ("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is
a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.").
177 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
178Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-Secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
179 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (stating that if a "state waives itsimmunity and consents to
suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.").
180 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62. 81 (2000) ("The ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The ADEA's purported abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity is accordingly invalid.").
181 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996): Atascadero State, 473 U.S. 234. 238 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
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reveal Congressional intent to "abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States." 82 In Quern
v.Jordan,183 the Supreme Court, citing Edelman v. Jordan,184 held that
[t]hough a § 1983 action may be instituted . . . a federal court's remedial power, consistent with
the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief .

. ,

and may not

include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.185
Jett would require a litigant to simultaneously assert that a state actor deprived the claimant of his
§ 1981 rights, and somehow also argue that the state actor falls within § 1983's definition of 'persons.' It
is clearly established, however, that "[flor the purposes of § 1983, states and arms of a state are not
'persons,' and a §1983 claim may therefore not be brought against those entities or their officials acting
in an official capacity." Restricting the remedial scheme available to claimants to a limited category of
'persons' creates an impenetrable hurdle that the holding of Jett failed to consider. The limited
applicability of § 1983 is especially ironic in light of Justice O'Connor's reasoning for refusing to
recognize an implied private right of action in § 1981 against state actors.
In Jett, Justice O'Connor noted, when discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, which was the precursor to § 1983, that Congress enacted the legislation "to expose State and local
officials to a new form of liability" that did not exist under § 1981.17 She further argued that "judicial
power to imply or create remedies"188 is limited "in the context of the 'state action' portion of § 1981,
where Congress has established its own remedial scheme." 189 There is, however, no form of liability or
remedial scheme under § 1983 for damages that can be successfully raised against sovereign States, or
state actors acting in their official capacity for violations of the rights created by § 1981. As a result, the
provisions of § 1983 fail to offer § 1981 litigants the 'remedial scheme' Congress intended when the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the precursor to § 1983, was enacted.
VII. Resolution
Notwithstanding Jett, litigants continue to file futile § 1981 actions against states and state actors.
In many instances, these litigants unsuccessfully argue that § 1981 actions for damages against
182

Quer v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332. 340-41 (1979).

183 See generally
id.
184 Edelman, 415 U.S. at
677.
185
440 U.S. at 340-41

Quern.

(citing Edelman. 415 U.S. at 677).

186Adams v. Orleans Parish Recovery Sch. Dist.. 463 Fed. Appx. 297, 298 (5th Cir. 2012).
187Jett, 491 U.S. 723.
188 Id.

189Id. at 731.
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governmental entities may be implied from the text of § 1981(c).1 90 Other litigants rely on Jett and raise
their § 1981 claims against States or state actors under § 1983.191 Regardless of their method of pleading,
litigants seeking damages against state actors are routinely thwarted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 192 Jett holds that § 1983 is the exclusive damage remedy for § 1981 actions against States and
state actors acting within their official capacities, but these governmental entities are not 'persons' subject
to liability under § 1983.193 This circularity cannot possibly be the remedy Congress intended in 1991
when it enacted § 1981(c), and expressly created a right to be free from deprivations by "governmental
actors."194
Fortunately, the Constitution is both the source of this problem and the source of its resolution.
The Eleventh Amendment's grant of immunity insulates States and state actors acting in their official
capacity from liability for damages. However, the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to
abrogate States' sovereign immunity and limit the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. 195 Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article. 196
There are many instances where Congress utilized § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
States' sovereignty to permit private litigants to pursue actions for damages against governmental actors.
In Franklin v. Gwinnett,197 the Supreme Court identified a number of statutes, including the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, in which Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.198
Congress amended Title VII to give victims of discrimination an opportunity to "recover for the very real
190 See Owens v. Dist. of Columbia, 2013 WL 563425 (D.C. Cir. 2013): Grinter v. Knight. 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008);
McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2011): Sledge v. Dist. of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
De v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 6605009 (N.D. 111.2012).
191Mveng-Whitted v. Va. State Univ., 2013 WL 65333 (E.D. Va. 2013); BBF Eng'g Servs. v. Mich., 2012 WL 380282 (E.D.
Mich. 2012).
192 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part. that "... a party may assert the following defenses by
motion... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
193 Will, 491 U.S. at 71: see also Ah Sing v. Haw. Dept. of Pub. Safety. 2013 WL 179482 (D. Ariz. 2013).
194 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(c).
195Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). Plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy states that "[a]
foundation premise of the federal system is that States, as sovereigns, are immune from suits for damages. save as they elect to
waive that defense.... As an exception to this principle. Congress may abrogate the States' immunity from suit pursuant to its
powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
196U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §5.
197 Franklin v. Gwinnett. 503 U.S. 60. 72 (1992).
198Id. at 72 ("In the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986. 100 Stat. 1845. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, Congress abrogated the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975.").
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effects of [the statutory violations]."1 99 Similarly, in 1990, Congress abrogated the States' sovereign
immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act to "authorize suits by private citizens for
money damages against public entities that violate § 12132.",200 The United States Supreme Court, in US
v. Georgia,21 held that "[i]n enacting the ADA, Congress 'invoke[d]
the sweep of congressional
202
authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Congressional abrogation of States' sovereignty is especially appropriate in this context where
Congress added express language in § 1981(c) to ameliorate racially discriminatory deprivations by
governmental actors. In this instance, § 1981 was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 203 The
Fourteenth Amendment was passed to provide constitutional protection for rights guaranteed in the 1866
Act, and to prevent repeal of the 1866 Act by future Congressional bodies.2 04 The language of the
Fourteenth Amendment expressly provides that "Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate
legislation the provisions of this article." 205 Consequently, there is no question that the Congressional
power to abrogate State immunity falls squarely within the scope of "appropriate legislation" 206 to enforce
the statutory provisions upon which the Fourteenth Amendment was founded.
In Kimel v. FloridaBd. Of Regents,207 the Supreme Court addressed the scope of Congress' § 5
powers. The Court noted that
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enforcement of legislation that merely parrots the
precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, Congress' power to 'enforce' the
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violations of rights guaranteed
thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself

199 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). H.R. Rep. No. 102-40. pt. 2, p.25 (1991). U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1991, pp. 549, 718 (Report of Committee on the Judiciary on the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445. n.9 (1967) ("There is no dispute that in enacting the 1972 Amendments to Title VII to extend
coverage to the States as employers. Congress exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." See H.R. Rep. No.
92-238. p.19 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-415. pp. 10 - 11 (1971): see Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr. 307 F.3d 318, 326, n.1 (5th
Cir. 2002).
200 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) ("Congress abrogated the States' sovereign immunity under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 337, as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.").
201 See generally
id.
202 Id. at 154.
203 U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.
204 Jett. 491 U.S. at 721 ("Many of the Members of the 3 9 th Congress viewed § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
'constitutionalizing' and expanding the protections of the 1866 Act and viewed what became § 5 of the Amendment as laying to
rest doubts shared by both sides of the aisle concerning the constitutionality of that measure. See, e.g., Cong. Globe. 3 9 th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2465 (1866)").

205 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
206

Id.

207 Kimel v. Fla Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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forbidden by the Amendment's text.208
The absence of a meaningful remedy under § 1983 is totally opposite of the Supreme Court's
argument in Jett that "Congress intended that the explicit remedial provisions of § 1983 be controlling in
the context of damages actions brought against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in §
1981."209 In fact, no meaningful damages remedy exists against States or state actors acting in their
official capacities. Abrogation of State sovereign immunity insures potential litigants of remedies that
extend far beyond potential financial redress for violations of § 1981(c). Imposition of damage remedies
may deter future discriminatory conduct, encourage States to change employment and other practices that
have historically deprived minority groups of the rights guaranteed by § 1981, and encourage more
litigants to challenge State policies and practices that violate §1981.210
For example, the 1972 Congress abrogated governmental immunity from Title VII liability.211
This action resulted in "10 million more employees being immediately added to Title VII's coverage."212
Justice Sotomayor discussed the benefits resulting from Congressional abrogation of States' immunity in
her dissenting opinion in Sossamon v. Texas.213 In Sossamon, the Court held that the language of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA" )214 was "too ambiguous" to
provide States with clear notice that they would be liable for monetary damages."215 Justice Sotomayor
argued, however, that the "unavailability of monetary relief will effectively shield unlawful policies and
practices from judicial review in many cases."216
Congressional abrogation of States' sovereign immunity is an exceptional remedy that must
conform to longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence. First, Congressional abrogation of States'
immunity "must be expressly and unequivocally stated in the text of the relevant statute."217 The
Supreme Court noted that express abrogation is necessary because it "ensures that Congress has
specifically considered State sovereign immunity . . . intentionally legislated on the matter. . .18

given "notice to the States."

21 9

and

The statutory language from § 12101(b)(4) of the ADA clearly illustrates

Id. at 81 (2000); see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct 1327, 1333 (2012), plurality opinion.
Jett, 491 U.S. at 731.
210 See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 737 (2003).
211 Equal Employment Opp. Act of 1972, Sec. 2., 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.
212 See generally EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/index.html.
213 Sossamon v. Texas. 131 S. Ct. 1651. 1663 (2011) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
214 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq. (LexisNexis 2000).
215 Sossamon. 131 S.Ct.
at 1663.
216 Id. at 1669.
217 Id.; see also Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 1333 ("Congress must make its intention to abrogate unmistakably
clear in the language
of the statute.").
218 Id.
219 Id.
208
209
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this point. The amended ADA statute provides, in pertinent part that, "[a] State shall not be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Chapter." 220 In U.S. v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court considered this language and determined that it is an "unequivocal expression [of] Congress's
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity."221
222
Second, in Coleman v. Court ofAppeals of Maryland,
the Supreme Court reiterated the principle

that "[1]egislation enacted under § 5 must be targeted at 'conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions."' 223 The Court further noted that Congress "must rely on more than
abstract generalities to subject the States to suits for damages."224 This analysis requires Congress to
"identify a pattern of constitutional violations," not merely respond to "a theory for why abrogating the
States' immunity aids in, or advances a stated congressional purpose." 225 In Coleman, the Court held that
the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993226 ("FMLA") was not targeted at an
identified pattern of gender-based discrimination which would warrant abrogation of the States' immunity
from suit.227
Nine years earlier, the Supreme Court in Nevada Dept. Of Human Resources v. Hibbs,228

interpreted the family-care provision in the FMLA 229 and reached a different conclusion. In Hibbs, the
Court found a well-documented pattern of unconstitutional gender discrimination in the administration
family-leave policies by States.230 This finding, coupled with specific statutory language demonstrating
Congressional intent to abrogate, was deemed "weighty enough to justify" abrogation of States'

220 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). In UnitedStates v. Georgia,the Supreme Court considered this language and held that "Title
II [of the ADA] creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity." United States v. Georgia. 546 U.S. 151. 159 (2000); see also
family-care provisions of the FMLA at issue in Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs:
The Act enables employees to seek damages against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
Court of competent jurisdiction, .. .[a]nd Congress has defined 'public agency' to include both 'the government of a
State or political subdivision thereof and 'any agency of ... a State. or a political subdivision of a State. Nev. Dept. of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003).
221 United States v. Georgia. 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006).
222 Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S.Ct 1327 (2012).
plurality opinion.
223Id. at 1333.
224Id. at 1337.
225Id. at 1338.

226 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(D).
227Coleman, 132 U.S. at 1336-37.
228 Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
229 Family care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(C).
230 Nev. Dept. of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 736 ("[T]he States' record of unconstitutional participation in. and fostering of,
gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5
legislation.").
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immunity.231

Finally, the Supreme Court will apply the "congruence and proportionality"232 test to determine
whether there is a nexus "between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.
This component of the analysis is accomplished by an "assessment of both the 'evil' or 'wrong'
that Congress intended to remedy, and the means Congress adopted to address that evil." 234
VIII. Conclusion

Congress enacted § 1981(c) to protect the rights of African Americans to make and enforce
contracts free of "impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State
law."235 Notwithstanding this express rights-creating language of § 1981(c), African Americans
employed by and interacting with States and state actors cannot successfully sustain a private cause of
action for damages against States and state actors under § 1981. A right without a meaningful remedy is
meaningless. Creation of such a useless right is a direct affront to the stated purpose of § 1981, which
was to expose States to "a new form of liability."236 When arguing in support of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, former Congressman Leon Panetta echoed the criticism made over 100 years prior by Senator Lyman
Trumball 237 against the creation of rights without accompanying enforcement remedies.238 Mr. Panetta
argued that
[t]here is a basic principle in this country, and it is a principle that says we believe in equality of
rights and that we believe that there are no rights unless there are remedies. We cannot just talk
about rights unless we are prepared to remedy wrongs.239
Mr. Panetta's argument continues to resonate today. Half of the twelve federal circuits capable of
exercising jurisdiction over a § 1981 claim follow Jett, and require litigants to plead their § 1981 actions
231Id. at 722.

232 In his concurring opinion in Coleman, Justice Scalia criticized this test arguing that is it a "flabby test" which is a "standing
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decision-making." Coleman. 132 S. Ct at 1338.
233Coleman, 132 S. Ct at 1333.
234Id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997)). While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial
measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. . .Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an
unwarranted response to another, lesser one." Id.
235 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(c).
236Jett, 491 U.S. at 723.
237 See Jett. 491 U.S. at 714.

238 Remarks by Leon Panetta, GOA Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, House. p. H10848-49, (Nov. 22, 1991).
239 Id.
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under § 1983. Notwithstanding the merits of their potential claims, litigants in these federal circuits do
not have any chance of prevailing against States or state actors because the Eleventh Amendment
insulates these governmental entities from liability. Potential litigants in the remaining federal circuits
face uncertainty regarding whether they will be required to overcome both barriers established by the
Supreme Court in Jett as well as the grant of sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment.
The result is a body of jurisprudence without controlling precedent, and a population of African
Americans without recourse for deprivation of their rights. This could not possibly be the intended result
of the 1991 Congressional amendments to § 1981. The federal judiciary seems unwilling, absent express
direction from the Supreme Court, to craft an implied private cause of action for damages into the
framework of § 1981. The only viable solution is the abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity
currently enjoyed by States and state actors from claims asserted under § 1983. Such an action would
provide a meaningful opportunity for the intended beneficiaries of § 1981 to have the merits of their
claims brought before the court, and give litigants the meaningful "remedial scheme" that Congress
intended when the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted.
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example, the English are a people, who occupy a discrete territory, and speak a separate language from
the French, who have their own language, lands, and culture (in this scheme, intense nationalism blinded
theorists from considering the strong similarities among European languages, and the common culture of
the continent). Today, and every bit as much in the past, every society, no matter how small-scale, is
multi-racial, multi-cultural (especially when embedded in a larger nation-state), and unbounded in its
social relations. When this is overlooked, all groups, when examined up close, appear to be dissolving,
and their members all cultural half-breeds. Under this standard, few petitioning groups can live up to the
idealized model of the "real" Indian.
VIII. Conclusion

As shown in this paper, the Mandatory Criteria have deep roots. They have survived more than a
century of development in social scientific thinking and a major shift in Indian policy, and stand
incompatible with both. Anthropology has long since abandoned most of the principles of its 19th
century origins. However, no elements from contemporary cultural theory have seeped into the FAP.
Only minor changes have been made. The use of race as an element, for instance, was eliminated by
Cohen's time (and would probably be glaringly anachronistic and improper if it appeared in the
Mandatory Criteria today). Territoriality was replaced in 1994 in recognition of the fact that groups do
not have to live together to maintain social relations (but its replacement seems much more demanding).
Yet, the OFA fails to see how equally anachronistic the other elements that make up the Criteria are. The
elements are inextricably bound to their original intentions--to determine which tribes have sufficiently
advanced up the scale of social evolution by assimilation to be "emancipated" from the wardship of
federal trust. Ostensibly, this is no longer the goal of the BIA--"restoration" is part of a broader policy of
self-determination. However, within the FAP, the principles and elements employed to meet the
restoration goal are incompatible with the goal itself.
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